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The Effect of Repeal o f the Capital Gain
Preference on Venture-Backed Companies
James R. Hamill and Inder Khurana

The 1986 Tax Reform Act eliminated preferential tax treatment of capital gains.
Proposals to reinstate the preference suggest that risky new investment will suffer
without favorable treatment of investment returns. Others have argued that
capital for risky new ventures is largely supplied by tax-exempt institutions, who
are expected to be indifferent to the taxation of realized gains. This study
evaluates the effects of the repeal of preferential capital gains taxation on venture
backed firms. The results show negative abnormal returns for sample firms
following the Senate’s vote to repeal the capital gain preference. The returns were
more negative for firms with a high debt-to-assets ratio, suggesting a more adverse
effect for firms relying on equity finance for future capital needs. Sample firms
were expected to be particularly sensitive to the tax change, and the results may
not be generalizable to other forms of risky investment.

I. INTRODUCTION

The 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA) changed the rate structure applicable to
corporate and noncorporate taxpayers, reducing the maximum marginal tax
rate and altering the progressivity of the tax system.^ The TRA also eliminated
the long standing preferential treatment of net capital gains. The effect that
the elimination of the capital gain preference will have on capital availability
for risky new ventures has been an issue of recent debate among policy
makers. In this study, we test the effects of TRA’s repeal of preferential capital
gain treatment on investors’ willingness to assume risk in Ae context of firms
backed by venture capital. Specifically, this study measures the effect of repeal
of the capital gain preference on share prices of venture backed firms and
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evaluates the differential im pact across venture backed firms. T he results
suggest that preferential treatm ent of capital gains reduces the required
risk-adjusted returns of firms th at rely on venture capital for growth.
The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 (RRA’93) increased the maxi
m um tax rate to 39.6 percent, effective January 1,1993, while m aintaining a
statutory maximum rate of 28 percent for n et capital gains. The RRA’93 also
introduced a 50 percent exclusion for stock that has been held for at least
five years in qualifying small businesses (capitalization n o t in excess of $50
m illion). The preferential treatm ent o f n et capital gains for tax years begin
ning in 1993 is not as favorable as for pre-1987 years, in which all taxpayers
received a 60 percent exclusion for n et capital gains and without the need to
satisfy a five-year holding period. Proponents of tax-favored treatm ent of
capital gains were generally unenthused by the RRA’93 changes. Thus, the
im pact of RRA’93 on sample firms is expected to be less than th at of TRA
because n o t all investment will qualify for the exclusion.

n.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: TAXES AND RISK TAKING

Theoretical research examining the effect of the tax structure on the
dem and for risky investment has generated ambiguous predictions, due to
an inability to specify the appropriate investor utility function. While theory
predicts that the tax system will effect risky investment behavior, the direction
is n o t clear. The absence of a strong theoretical econom ic foundation
increases the need for empirical evidence that would be pertinent to re
searchers and policy makers considering tax-based investm ent incentives,
including the reinstatem ent of a capital gain preference for all forms of
investment.
Theoretical research examining the effect of the tax stm cture on risk-taking
behavior has included the effects of three factors: the tax rate (generally
m odelled as a movement from no tax to the introduction of a specified tax);
the nature of the tax as proportional or progressive in relation to income;
and whether the investor is perm itted full loss offset, limited loss offset, or no
loss offset from the investment.
Domar and Musgrave (1944) note that the introduction of an incom e tax
may affect investment behavior through a change in the ratio o f return to
risk, and through a desire to generate additional incom e to ofifeet the effects
of the tax. Mossin (1968) and Stiglitz (1969), using an expected utility m odel
and assuming risk-averse investors, show an increase in the tax rate leads the
investor to substitute risky investment for a risk-free investment in an attem pt
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to com pensate for some of the loss of income caused by the tax. Since wealth
changes, it is necessary to consider Pratt-Arrow measures of relative and
absolute risk aversion.^ With full loss offset, risk taking will always increase
with an increase in a proportional tax. With no loss offset the effects are
ambiguous with risk taking expected to increase at low tax rates and decrease
at high rates. Because the current tax law limits the ability to offset losses to
$3,000 p er year, the Mossin and Stiglitz model produces ambiguous predic
tions o f the effects of TRA on risk taking.
Fellingham andW olfson (1978) observe that investors may be risk neutral
over some relevant range of after-tax wealth, but the institutional friction of
a tax will lead to induced risk aversion over pre-tax returns. Using this
framework for consideration of a risk averse (quadratic) utility function, they
analyze both proportional and progressive rate structures. Taxation affects
risk taking in two ways. First, it reduces the dispersion of pre-tax returns,
unambiguously increasing the dem and for risky assets (dispersion-reduction
effect). Second, it reduces the investor’s wealth position (wealth-reduction
effect). The im pact of the wealth reduction effect is ambiguous, dependent
on local measures of relative and absolute risk aversion. A progressive tax
system is shown to generate ambiguous predictions for any measures of risk
aversion. However, ceteris paribus, the dem and for a risky asset should decrease
for an increase in the progressivity of the system.
The theoretical work, to date, has failed to provide clear predictions of
the effects of the tax structure on investment behavior. In addition to the
inability to observe investor utility functions, it is not clear w hether the tax
system can be characterized as progressive or proportional, or w hether the
system provides a practical constraint on full loss offset.
C urrent Policy Debate
Although theory is ambiguous, the effect of preferential capital gain
taxation on risk-taking behavior has been frequendy debated in the policy
arena. Bygrane and Timmons (1992, p. 262) state that “within the venture
capital industry, it is almost universally believed that the federal capital gains
tax rate is the m ost im portant influence on the flows of venture capital.” The
most frequent argum ent against the need for a capital gain preference to
stimulate risky new investm ent is that the venture capital industry is domi
nated by tax-exempt investors that would be indifferent to the taxation of
investm ent returns. This has been docum ented by Poterba (1989) and others
with respect to outside providers of funds after the early stages of growth of
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a new venture. However, the National Venture Capital Association reports
th at taxable investors provide the mzgotity of early-stage financing, with
tax-exempt investors coming into the m arket in later stages (Walker 8c
Bloomfield, 1989). Proponents of the need for tax-favored treatm ent of
capital gains contend that RRA’93 is n o t likely to stim ulate new risky invest
m ent because most capital gains are still taxed at a 28 percent rate. Qualifying
for a 50 percent exclusion requires a five-year holding period and is lim ited
to regular corporations with capitalization n o tin excess of $50 million. Prior
to 1987, all taxpayers qualified for a 60 percent exclusion for n et capital gains
provided a one-year holding period was satisfied.
W ith the diverse group of investors providing fimds to risky new ventures,
it is n o t clear what the effect of capital gains tax policy will be. T here is some
evidence that changes in capital gains taxes can affect equity values (AmoakoAdu, Rashid, 8c Stebbins, 1992), but no direct evidence on the effect on
venture backed firms. Given the dearth of theoretical and empirical guid
ance, and the im portance of this issue to policy makers, research that
illuminates the effects of tax law changes on the price o f risky investm ent will
be an im portant contribution to tax policy literature.
Venture Capital Financing
Start-up firms that are backed by venture financing m ust generally rely on
the venture financiers to fund their growth through distinct “rounds” of
financing (Camp 8c Sexton, 1992). As the firm grows, the entrepreneur trades
a progressively larger share of the equity of the venture for the fim ding
needed for growth. O n average Coopers and Lybrand (1986) foim d that
entrepreneurs surrendered 37 percent of the equity during the first roxmd
of financing, and cumulatively 50 percent and 58 percent during the second
and third rounds, respectively.
In an analysis of the venture-capital m arket, Sahlman (1990) indicates
that approximately two-thirds of organized venture capital funds are provided
by private limited partnerships. The venture investors m ost commonly ac
quire convertible preferred stock that is held for an average o f 4.9 years.
N orton and Tenenbaum (1992), in a survey of venture capital firms, show
th at common stock investments are atypical because the venture capitalist
prefers a priority claim to firm assets. Although a venture capitalist’s preferred
stock often does not provide for a current dividend, a dividend can be paid
at the discretion of the Board of Directors, and the venture capitalist typically
controls the Board. Further, preferred stock dividend payments are typically
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cumulative, providing the investor with a priority claim for unpaid dividends.
A typical organized venture fund invests in only 12 projects each year selected
from 1000 proposals.^ Discount rates can be as high as 70 percent for start-up
stages, and typically range between 25 and 35 percent for initial public
offerings (Sahlman, 1990).
At the time th at a firm is initially taken public, the m arket is expected to
price the firm ’s securities on the assumption that required future financing
will be available at some expected price. Sahlman (1990) indicates that
venture capitalists exercise control over investments by staging the commit
m ent of capital, and th at “each company begins life knowing that it has only
enough capital to reach the next stage.” Neeley (1992) documents that
early-stage firms suffer m ore from liquidity shortfalls than do established
firms because of differential access to capital markets. Thus, early-stage firms
can be expected to be m ore adversely affected by tax law changes that affect
the availability of credit. N orton and T enenbaum ’s (1992) survey data also
dem onstrate that venture capitalists are sensitive to expected tax law changes.
If TRA affected the price of private risky investment, then the m arket
would revise its expectations of the cost or availability of future financing in
the post-TRA era. Presumably, no financing will be available at the price the
venture backed firm is willing to pay, or financing will be available at a higher
price than initially expected. Either of these alternatives m ight also cause the
firm to restructure its financing plans, which can be costiy.^
Research Hypotheses
litzen b erg er and Ramaswzimy (1979) empirically find that stocks with
greater tax exposure tend to sell at lower prices and greater than expected
pre-tax returns. H igher than expected pre-tax returns are dem anded by the
m arket to offset the greater tax exposure and provide equivalent after-tax
returns of equally risky stocks with different tax exposures. Thus the pricing
o f initial public offerings (IPO) m ade by venture backed firms prior to the
TRA repeal of the capital gain preference is expected to incorporate the cash
flow consequences of a favorable tax treatm ent for capital gains.
To the extent that elim ination o f the capital gain preference discouraged
private risk taking behavior, security returns of venture backed firms should
be negative at the time of deliberations and public announcem ents relating
to the repeal o f the preference. Stated in terms of the first research hypothe
sis:

102

JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS nNANCE

3(2) 1994

H I; Security prices of venture backed firms are reduced following an
nouncem ents that increase the probability of repeal of the capital
gain preference.

Poterba (1989) reports that in addition to equity finance, venture backed
firms often use debt and other sources of capital. Based on 1976 data, he finds
that debt accoimts for 70 percent of the capitalization o f start-up enterprises.
Sahlman (1990) and Neeley (1992) find that venture capitalists typically use
preferred equity financing. If venture financing is expected to be the source of
fiiture fiinds, it is expected that venture backed firms must rely m ore on equity
rather than other sources of financing for future growth. The decline in stock
prices at the time a tax law change adversely affects equity finance is expected
to be a direct fiinction of the capital structure at the time o f the change.
Neeley (1992) also finds that the venture capitalist’s preference for equity
finance is related to the expected future tax rate, suggesting a reluctance to
offer equity financing when tax changes are detrim ental to equity gains.
Venture firms are then expected to be m ore adversely affected by the repeal
of the capital gain preference the higher the ratio of debt to assets. This is
because firms with a relatively high debt to assets ratio have lower equity
capitalization and m ust rely m ore heavily on future sources of equity finance.
The capital gain repeal will then force them to seek alternative m ethods of
financing or to obtain equity capital at a higher cost, if the cost of equity
increased post-TRA. Stated in terms of the second research hypothesis;

H2; Ceteris paribus, the security price response of venture backed firms
following annoxmcements that increase the probability of repeal of the
capital gain preference will be direcdy related to the debt-assets ratio.

Research Design
This study uses an interrupted time series design in order to study the
effects of repeal of the capital gain preference on venture-backed firms.
Sample Selection

The study is based upon a sample of 181 venture backed firms that m ade
initial public offerings from 1983 to 1985 as part of first round financing. The
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Table 1
Sample Reconciliation

Initial sample as identified from the Venture CapitalJournal
Less stock return data unavailable on CRSP tapes
Less financial statement data unavailable on compustat
Final Sample

1983

1984

1985

Total

121
16
105
4
101

53
3
50
6
44

46
4
42
6
36

220
23
197
16
181

1983-1985 period is selected because we are interested in firms that are in
the early stages of venture financing and that will be heavily dependent on
future availability of capital for growth. The time period for the IPO predates
the legislative discussions of TRA, which occurred throughout the 1986
calendar year.
The initial sample was selected from the Venture CapitalJournal Firms were
then deleted based upon availability of financial statem ent data on Compustat
tapes and stock return data on the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) daily tapes. Compustat and CRSP have a selection bias in favor of
larger firms. It was expected that changes in capital gains tax policy would
have a m ore detrim ental effect on smaller firms, and the use of CRSP and
Com pustat firms would not bias in favor of supporting the research hypothe-

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics on Firm-Characteristics of Final Sample
Standard
N

Net Sales
Net Income
Total Debt
Total Assets
Return on Assets
Return on Equity
DebtiAsset Ratio
Market:Book Ratio

181
181
181
181
181
181
181
174

Mean

67.80
1.32
27.17
60.23
-6.90
27.30
0.37
1.77

Deviation

Median

95.33
7.77
53.10
78.09
27.00
416.80
0.23
16.99

28.14
0.95
9.45
30.97
2.50
4.70
0.32
2.43

Notes: ^Monetary amounts are in millions

^All amounts are based on fiscal year 1985 financial statements
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ses. O f the 181 firms in the final sample, 101 firms underw ent the IPO in 1983,
44 in 1984, and 36 in 1985. Sample tests were conducted with the fiill sample
firom 1983 and then the individual firms from 1984 and 1985 to determ ine if
results could be biased by the large num ber of 1983 firms. Eighty-three
percent of the final sample firms are listed on NASDAQ. Using two (four)digit SIC codes, 33 (85) industries were represented in the final sample. Table
1 shows a reconciliation of the full sample with the firms included in sample
tests.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for sample firms.
Selection o f Event Dates

Legislative histories. Tax Notes and the BNA Daily Tax Report w ere used
to p rep are an extensive chronicle of events related to the passage o f TRA.®
Since this study was interested in the effects of the repeal of the capital
gain preference, event dates were selected to isolate discussions o f capital
gain repeal and to assess dates th at would affect the probability o f passage
o f the capital gain repeal. This event date selection was designed to
m inim ize the confounding effects of the general effect o f TRA on sample
firms.
We identify four key event periods affecting the probability of repeal of
the capital gain preference. Each event period is two days in length, covering
the day of the event and the succeeding trading day. The dates selected are:
1. May 2 and 3, 1986—Senate Finance Com m ittee Chairm an Packwood introduces a reform m easure th at offers rates of 15 and 27
p ercen t and the first m ention of repeal of the capital gain prefer
ence since Novem ber 1984 Treasury proposals. T he adm inistration
and some com m ittee m em bers do n o t approve o f the capital gain
repeal;
2. May 7 and 8—^Packwood gets approval from the com m ittee for his
earlier proposal, including repeal of the capital gain preference;
3. May 29 and 30—^Packwood announces that he intends to stand firm
on capital gains repeal, and 31 Senators support a no am endm ent
proposal. Senator Cranston attempts to gather support for retention
of the capital gain preference; and
4. June 24 and 25—the Senate, by a 97-3 vote, passes a bill that elim inated
the capital gain preference.
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Methodology

The hypotheses are tested by form ing an equally-weighted portfoUo of
sample firms and estimating the abnorm al return of the portfolio during the
kth event’s announcem ent period. The abnorm al return is estimated over
206 trading days ending O ctober 23,1986, using the following return gener
ating process.
rt=ao + bormt + ^Z kD kt+et

where

n = R eturn on an equally-weighted portfolio of common stock
on day t
Tmt = Return on the CRSP value-weighted index on day t.
Dkt = one for the announcem ent period of the M i event concern
ing the repeal of the capital gain preference, and zero
otherwise.
Ct = Residuals for the portfolio on day t.
do = Estimated average intercept.
bo = Estimated average beta for contem poraneous m arket vari
able.
Zkt = Estimated abnorm al portfolio return during event k.
t= 1, 2 , . . . 206 days.
k= 1, 2, 3, and 4.

The advantage of form ing a portfolio is that tests of the average m arket
reaction are sensitive to both contem poraneous cross-dependencies in the
error term and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity in those error terms.

n . RESULTS
Results o f the test of a nonzero effect (on average) on the stockholders of
sample fir m s around each event are reported in Table 3. Column three of
this table shows the average abnorm al returns for each event estimated from
an equally-weighted portfolio of sample firms. Event 4 has the most negative
param eter estimate, with an average abnorm al return of -0.53 percent. The
^-statistic reflecting the significance of the average abnorm al returns is signifi
cant at the a = 0.05 level. This event date is when the Senate defeated a
proposal to retain a capital gain preference, and likely signalled that the final
tax bill will no t contain a capital gain preference. Consistent with Hypothesis
1, sample firms experience negative returns on this event. To test for the

106

JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE

3(2) 1994

Table 3
Portfolio Abnormal Returns (in percent)
Surrounding Key Event Dates^
Event

Number of
TradingDays

Parameter
Estimate

t-Statistic

1
2
3
4

2
2
2
2

0.14
0.12
-0.11
-0.53

0.39
0.48
-0.45
-2.07**

Notes: ^Event 1 is May 2/3,1986. Event 2 is May 7/8, event 3 is May

29/30, and event 4 is June 24/25.
**Significant at the .05 level using a two-tailed test.

sensitivity o f results to the predom inance of 1983 IPOs, weighted portfoho
regression is repeated using IPOs for 1984 and 1985 only, with no significant
differences in the results.
N one o f the other three events approach significance at the a = 0.10 level,
suggesting there is no evidence of significant changes in expectations for the
sample of venture-backed firms. At the time of the other events, there is still
some uncertainty of the status of capital gain repeal, and a Senate am endm ent
has been offered to retain the preference.
Thus, the absence of significance for three of the four dates may not be
surprising given the disapproval that initially greeted the Packwood propos
als. The m arket apparentiy adjusted only when the repeal of the capital gain
preference was certain. To strengthen the link between the Event 4 results
and the future financing needs of the sample firms, we conducted an
additional analysis by firm capital structure.
Table 4 presents summary statistics of the abnorm al returns of individ
ual firms for Event 4. The m edian debt-to-asset ratio obtained from the
financial statem ents im m ediately preceding January 1, 1986, is used to
classify firms into high versus low debt groups. The m ean abnorm al returns
rep o rted in Table 2 indicate systematic differences in the abnorm al returns
o f high and low debt firms. The /^-statistic used to test the significance of
the difference between the portfolio returns o f the high and low debt firms
indicates th at high debt firms have significantly lower abnorm al returns
th an low deb t firms, each calculated for Event 4. T he W ilcoxon signed-rank
test also indicates significant negative returns for the high d eb t firms
aro u n d Event 4.®
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Table 4
Summary Statistics of Individual Abnormal Returns (in percent)
by Firm Type for Event 4
Quartiles
Firm

N

Meai^

0.25

0.50

0.75

Percent Negative

High Debt
Low Debt

90
91

-0.84
-0.21

-2.32
-1.40

-0.72
-0.27

0.18
0.77

56

Notes: “ Firm type is based upon the median debt-to-asset ratio in the financial statements immediately

preceding January 1,1986.
Mean abnormal return for event 4.
“ ‘significant at the 0.01 level using one-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test.

m.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPUCATIONS

In this study, we found evidence that venture-backed firms experienced
negative abnorm al returns when the Senate voted to approve a bill repealing
preferential treatm ent for n et capital gains. Venture-backed firms were ex
pected to be particularly sensitive to changes in the taxation of capital gains,
because they relied heavily on entrepreneurial risk-taking. In addition to
finding evidence of an adverse effect for the entire sample of venture-backed
firms, we found firms with a relatively high ratio of debt to assets to be the
most adversely affected. This was consistent with the greater need for future
sources of equity financing for such highly levered firms. The results of this
study supported the view that investment in particularly risky ventures was
sensitive to the taxation of capital gains. Sample firms were selected because
they were expected to be particularly sensitive to the taxation o f capital gains.
Thus, the results may not be generalizable to other forms of risky investment.
Future research could evaluate the effects of preferential tax treatm ent on
the returns of other assets.
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NOTES
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

The exact effect on the progressivity of the system is an empirical issue. See Keifer (1986)
for an estimate of the effects of the Senate Finance Committee bill.
Absolute risk aversion is measured
R ^Y )= l f \ Y ) /U\Y)y where a = the amount
invested in the risky asset and Y = the fmal wealth position. Increasing absolute risk
aversion means that as wealth increases, the amount invested in the risky asset decreases
(i.e., risk aversion increases with wealth increases). Relative risk aversion is measured as
Ri{Y) = - U '\Y ) Y /U \Y ) , where r= return on the risk-free asset. Increasing relative risk
aversion means that as wealth increases, the proportion of wealth held in the risky asset
decreases.
The difficulty in securing financing from organized venture financiers suggests a strong
demand for other sources of financing. Even if a mzyority of organized flmds are
comprised of tax-exempt investors, taxable investors are expected to be a significant
source of funds for projects not approved by the organized funds.
For example, the firm can issue interest-bearing convertible debentures that provide an
income stream to the capital provider with the opportunity to later acquire an equity
interest in the firm. Alternatively, venture capitalists might fund firms that are capable
of producing sufficient current cash flow to pay dividends on the preferred stock.
Scholes, Wilson, and Wolfson (1990) and Collins and Shackelford (1991) provide
evidence of capital structure responses to tax law changes.
Scholes and Wolfson (1992) note that there was considerable doubt in early 1986
regarding the fate of specific provisions of TRA. Similarly, Tax Notes (1986) reported
that the status of compromise legislation was “fragile” unless Senate Finance Committee
Chairman Packwood and House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Rostenkowski
could agree how to raise corporate taxes to ensure revenue neutrality in the compromise
plan. This suggested more narrow **event windows” than would be typical for a tax act,
and assisted in mitigating the effects of non-tax variables in interpreting research results.
Once again, no differences were found when the sample was limited to 1984 and 1985
IPO firms.
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